On Cognitive Preferences and the Plausibility of Rule-based Models by Fürnkranz, Johannes et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
3.
01
31
6v
4 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
2 A
pr
 20
19
On Cognitive Preferences and
the Plausibility of Rule-based Models
Johannes Fu¨rnkranz
TU Darmstadt
Department of Computer Science
Hochschulstraße 10
D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany
juffi@ke.tu-darmstadt.de
Toma´sˇ Kliegr
University of Economics, Prague
Department of Information and Knowledge Engineering
na´m Winstona Churchilla 4
13067 Prague, Czech Republic
tomas.kliegr@vse.cz
Heiko Paulheim
University of Mannheim
Institut fu¨r Informatik und Wirtschaftsinformatik
D-68159 Mannheim, Germany
heiko@informatik.uni-mannheim.de
V4.0, April 2019
Abstract
It is conventional wisdom in machine learning and data mining that logical models such as rule sets
are more interpretable than other models, and that among such rule-based models, simpler models are
more interpretable than more complex ones. In this position paper, we question this latter assumption by
focusing on one particular aspect of interpretability, namely the plausibility of models. Roughly speak-
ing, we equate the plausibility of a model with the likeliness that a user accepts it as an explanation for
a prediction. In particular, we argue that—all other things being equal—longer explanations may be
more convincing than shorter ones, and that the predominant bias for shorter models, which is typically
necessary for learning powerful discriminative models, may not be suitable when it comes to user accep-
tance of the learned models. To that end, we first recapitulate evidence for and against this postulate, and
then report the results of an evaluation in a crowdsourcing study based on about 3,000 judgments. The
results do not reveal a strong preference for simple rules, whereas we can observe a weak preference for
longer rules in some domains. We then relate these results to well-known cognitive biases such as the
conjunction fallacy, the representative heuristic, or the recogition heuristic, and investigate their relation
to rule length and plausibility.
Keywords: inductive rule learning interpretable models cognitive bias
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1 Introduction
In their classical definition of the field, Fayyad et al. (1996) have defined knowledge discovery in databases
as “the non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful, and ultimately understandable
patterns in data.” Research has since progressed considerably in all of these dimensions in a mostly
data-driven fashion. The validity of models is typically addressed with predictive evaluation techniques
such as significance tests, hold-out sets, or cross validation (Japkowicz & Shah, 2011), techniques which
are now also increasingly used for pattern evaluation (Webb, 2007). The novelty of patterns is typi-
cally assessed by comparing their local distribution to expected values, in areas such as novelty detec-
tion (Markou & Singh, 2003a,b), where the goal is to detect unusual behavior in time series, subgroup
discovery (Kralj Novak et al., 2009), which aims at discovering groups of data that have unusual class
distributions, or exceptional model mining (Duivesteijn et al., 2016), which generalizes this notion to dif-
ferences with respect to data models instead of data distributions. The search for useful patterns has mostly
been addressed via optimization, where the utility of a pattern is defined via a predefined objective function
(Hu & Mojsilovic, 2007) or via cost functions that steer the discovery process into the direction of low-
cost or high-utility solutions (Elkan, 2001). To that end, Kleinberg et al. (1998) formulated a data mining
framework based on utility and decision theory.
Arguably, the last dimension, understandability or interpretability, has received the least attention in
the literature. The reason why interpretability has rarely been explicitly addressed is that it is often equated
with the presence of logical or structured models such as decision trees or rule sets, which have been
extensively researched since the early days of machine learning. In fact, much of the research on learning
such models has been motivated with their interpretability. For example, Fu¨rnkranz et al. (2012) argue
that rules “offer the best trade-off between human and machine understandability”. Similarly, it has been
argued that rule induction offers a good ”mental fit” to decision-making problems (van den Eijkel, 1999;
Weihs & Sondhauss, 2003). Their main advantage is the simple logical structure of a rule, which can be
directly interpreted by experts not familiar with machine learning or data mining concepts. Moreover, rule-
based models are highly modular, in the sense that they may be viewed as a collection of local patterns
(Fu¨rnkranz, 2005; Knobbe et al., 2008; Fu¨rnkranz & Knobbe, 2010), whose individual interpretations are
often easier to grasp than the complete predictive theory. For example, Lakkaraju et al. (2016) argued that
rule sets (which they call decision sets) are more interpretable than decision lists, because they can be
decomposed into individual local patterns.
Only recently, with the success of highly precise but largely inscrutable deep learning models, has
the topic of interpretability received serious attention, and several workshops in various disciplines have
been devoted to the topic of learning interpretable models at conferences like ICML (Kim et al., 2016,
2017, 2018), NIPS (Wilson et al., 2016; Tosi et al., 2017; Mu¨ller et al., 2017) or CHI (Gillies et al., 2016).
Moreover, several books on the subject have already appeared or an in preparation (Jair Escalante et al.,
2018; Molnar, 2019), funding agencies like DARPA have recognized the need for explainable AI1, and the
General Data Protection Regulation of the EC includes a ”right to explanation”, which may have a strong
impact on machine learning and data mining solutions (Piatetsky-Shapiro, 2018).
The strength of many recent learning algorithms, most notably deep learning (LeCun et al., 2015;
Schmidhuber, 2015), feature learning (Mikolov et al., 2013), fuzzy systems (Alonso et al., 2015) or topic
modeling (Blei, 2012), is that latent variables are formed during the learning process. Understanding the
meaning of these hidden variables is crucial for transparent and justifiable decisions. Consequently, visual-
ization of suchmodel components has recently received some attention (Chaney & Blei, 2012; Zeiler & Fergus,
2014; Rothe & Schu¨tze, 2016). Alternatively, some research has been devoted to trying to convert such ar-
canemodels to more interpretable rule-based or tree-based theories (Andrews et al., 1995; Craven & Shavlik,
1997; Schmitz et al., 1999; Zilke et al., 2016) or to develop hybrid models that combine the interpretability
of logic with the predictive strength of statistical and probabilisticmodels (Besold et al., 2017; Tran & d’Avila Garcez,
2018; Hu et al., 2016).
Instead of making the entire model interpretable, methods like LIME (Ribeiro et al., 2016) are able to
provide local explanations for inscrutable models, allowing to trade off fidelity to the original model with
interpretability and complexity of the local model. In fact, Martens & Provost (2014) report on experiments
that illustrate that such local, instance-level explanation are preferable to global, document-level models.
1http://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence
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An interesting aspect of rule-based theories is that they can be considered as hybrids between local and
global explanations (Fu¨rnkranz, 2005): A rule set may be viewed as a global model, whereas the individual
rule that fires for a particular example may be viewed as a local explanation.
Nevertheless, in our view, many of these approaches fall short in that they take the interpretability
of rule-based models for granted. Interpretability is often considered to correlate with complexity, with
the intuition that simpler models are easier to understand. Principles like Occam’s Razor (Blumer et al.,
1987) or Minimum Description Length (MDL) (Rissanen, 1978) are commonly used heuristics for model
selection, and have shown to be successful in overfitting avoidance. As a consequence, most rule learning
algorithms have a strong bias towards simple theories. Despite the necessity of a bias for simplicity for
overfitting avoidance, we argue in this paper that simpler rules are not necessarily more interpretable, at
least not when other aspects of interpretability beyond the mere syntactic readability are considered. This
implicit equation of comprehensibility and simplicity was already criticized by, e.g., Pazzani (2000), who
argued that ”there has been no study that shows that people find smaller models more comprehensible or
that the size of a model is the only factor that affects its comprehensibility.” There are also a few systems
that explicitly strive for longer rules, and recent evidence has shed some doubt on the assumption that
shorter rules are indeed preferred by human experts. We will discuss the relation of rule complexity and
interpretability at length in Section 2.
Other criteria than accuracy and model complexity have rarely been considered in the learning pro-
cess. For example, Gabriel et al. (2014) proposed to consider the semantic coherence of its conditions
when formulating a rule. Pazzani et al. (2001) show that rules that respect monotonicity constraints are
more acceptable to experts than rules that do not. As a consequence, they modify a rule learner to re-
spect such constraints by ignoring attribute values that generally correlate well with other classes than the
predicted class. Freitas (2013) reviews these and other approaches, compares several classifier types with
respect to their comprehensibility, and points out several drawbacks of model size as a single measure of
interpretability.
In his pioneering framework for inductive learning, Michalski (1983) stressed its links with cognitive
science, noting that “inductive learning has a strong cognitive science flavor”, and postulates that “descrip-
tions generated by inductive inference bear similarity to human knowledge representations” with reference
to Hintzman (1978), an elementary text from psychology on human learning. Michalski (1983) considers
adherence to the comprehensibility postulate to be ”crucial” for inductive rule learning, yet, as discussed
above, it is rarely ever explicitly addressed beyond equating it with model simplicity. Miller (2019) makes
an important first step by providing a comprehensive review of what is known in the social sciences about
explanations and discusses these findings in the context of explainable artificial intelligence.
In this paper, we primarily intend to highlight this gap in machine learning and data mining research. In
particular, we focus on the plausibility of rules, which, in our view, is an important aspect that contributes
to interpretability (Section 2). In addition to the comprehensibility of a model, which we interpret in the
sense that the user can understand the learned model well enough to be able to manually apply it to new
data, and its justifiability, which specifies whether the model is in line with existing knowledge, we argue
that a good model should also be plausible, i.e., be convincing and acceptable to the user. For example, as
an extreme case, a default model that always predicts the majority class, is very interpretable, but in most
cases not very plausible. We will argue that different models may have different degrees of plausibility,
even if they have the same discriminative power. Moreover, we believe that the plausibility of a model is—
all other things being equal—not related or in some cases even positively correlated with the complexity of
a model.
To that end, we also report the results of a crowdsourcing evaluation of learned rules in four domains
(Section 3). Overall, the performed experiments are based on nearly 3,000 judgments collected from 390
distinct participants. The results show that there is indeed no evidence that shorter rules are preferred by
humans. On the contrary, we could observe a preference for longer rules in two of the studied domains
(Section 4). In the following, we then relate this finding to related results in the psychological literature,
such as the conjunctive fallacy (Section 5) and insensitivity to sample size (Section 6). Section 7 is devoted
to a discussion of the relevance of conditions in rules, which may not always have the expected influence on
one’s preference, in accordance with the recently described weak evidence effect. The remaining sections
focus on the interplay of cognitive factors andmachine readable semantics: Section 8 covers the recognition
heuristic, Section 9 discusses the effect of semantic coherence on interpretability, and Section 10 briefly
highlights the lack of methods for learning structured rule-based models.
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2 Aspects of Interpretability
Interpretability is a very elusive concept which we use in an intuitive sense. Kodratoff (1994) has already
observed that it is an ill-defined concept, and has called upon several communities from both academia
and industry to tackle this problem, to ”find objective definitions of what comprehensibility is”, and to
open ”the hunt for probably approximate comprehensible learning”. Since then, not much has changed.
For example, Lipton (2016) still suggests that the term interpretability is ill-defined. In fact, the concept
can be found under different names in the literature, including understandability, interpretability, compre-
hensibility, plausibility, trustworthiness, justifiability and others. They all have slightly different semantic
connotations.
A thorough clarification of this terminology is beyond the scope of this paper, but in the following,
we briefly highlight different aspects of interpretability, and then proceed to clearly define and distinguish
comprehensibility and plausibility, the two aspects that are pertinent to this work.
2.1 Three Aspects of Interpretability
In this section, we attempt to bring some order into the multitude of terms that are used in the context of
interpretability. Essentially, we distinguish three aspects of interpretability (see also Figure 1):
syntactic interpretability: This aspect is concerned with the ability of the user to comprehend the knowl-
edge that is encoded in the model, in very much the same way as the definition of a term can be
understood in a conversation or a textbook.
epistemic interpretability: This aspect assesses to what extent the model is in line with existing domain
knowledge. A model can be interpretable in the sense that the user can operationalize and apply it,
but the encoded knowledge or relationships are not well correlated with the user’s prior knowledge.
For example, a model which states that the temperature is rising on odd-numbered days and falling
on even-numbered days has a high syntactic interpretability but a low epistemic interpretability.
pragmatic interpretability: Finally, we argue that it is important to capture whether the model serves the
intended purpose. A model can be perfectly interpretable in the syntactic and epistemic sense, but
have a low pragmatic value for the user. For example, the simple model that the temperature tomor-
row will be roughly the same as today is obviously very interpretable in the syntactic sense, it is also
quite consistent with our experience and therefore interpretable in the epistemic sense, but it may not
be satisfying as an acceptable explanation for a weather forecast.
Note that these three categories essentially correspond to the grouping of terms pertinent to inter-
pretability which has previously been introduced by Bibal & Fre´nay (2016). They treat terms like com-
prehensibility, understandability, and mental fit, as essentially synonymous to interpretability, and use
them to denote syntactic interpretability. In a second group, Bibal & Fre´nay (2016) bring notions such as
interestingness, usability, and acceptability together, which essentially corresponds to our notion of prag-
matic interpretability. Finally, they have justifiability as a separate category, which essentially corresponds
to what we mean by epistemic interpretability. We also subsume their notion of explanatory as explain-
ability in this group, which we view as synonymous to justifiability. A key difference to their work lies in
our view that all three of the above are different aspects of interpretability, whereas Bibal & Fre´nay (2016)
view the latter two groups as different but related concepts.
We also note in passing that this distinction loosely corresponds to prominent philosophical treatments
of explanations (Mayes, 2001). Classical theories, such as the deductive-nomological theory of explanation
(Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948), are based on the validity of the logical connection between premises and
conclusion. Instead, Van Fraassen (1977) suggests a pragmatic theory of explanations, according to which
the explanation should provide the answer to a (why-)question. Therefore, the same proposition may have
different explanations, depending on the information demand. For example, an explanation for why a
patient was infected with a certain disease may relate to her medical conditions (for the doctor) or to her
habits (for the patient). Thus, pragmatic interpretability is a much more subjective and user-centered notion
than epistemic interpretability.
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Figure 1: Three aspects of interpretability
However, clearly these aspects are not independent. As already noted by Bibal & Fre´nay (2016), syn-
tactic interpretability is a prerequisite to the other two notions. Moreover, we also view epistemic inter-
pretability as a prerequisite to pragmatic interpretability: In case a model is not in line with the user’s prior
knowledge and therefore has a low epistemic value, it also will have a low pragmatic value to the user.
Moreover, the differences between the terms shown in Figure 1 are soft, and not all previous studies have
used them in consistent ways. For example, Muggleton et al. (2018) employ a primarily syntactic notion
of comprehensibility (as we will see in Section 2.2), and evaluate it by testing whether the participants in
their study can successfully apply the acquired knowledge to new problems. In addition, it is also measured
whether they can give meaningful names to the explanations they deal with, and whether these names are
helpful in applying the knowledge. Thus, these experiments try to capture epistemic aspects as well.
2.2 Comprehensibility
One of the few attempts for an operational definition of interpretability is given in the works of Schmid et al.
(2017) and Muggleton et al. (2018), who related the concept to objective measurements such as the time
needed for inspecting a learned concept, for applying it in practice, or for giving it a meaningful and correct
name. This gives interpretability a clearly syntactic interpretation in the sense defined in Section 2.1.
Following Muggleton et al. (2018), we refer to this type of syntactic interpretability as comprehensibility,
and define it as follows:
Definition 1 (Comprehensibility) A model m1 is more ”comprehensible” than a model m2 with respect
to a given task if a human user makes fewer mistakes in the application of modelm1 to new samples drawn
randomly from the task domain than when applyingm2.
Thus, a model is considered to be comprehensible if a user is able to understand all the mental calculations
that are prescribed by the model, and can successfully apply the model to new tasks drawn from the same
population. A model is more comprehensible than another model if the user’s error rate in doing so is
smaller.2 Muggleton et al. (2018) study various related, measurable quantities, such as the inspection time,
the rate with which the meaning of the predicate is recognized from its definition, or the time used for
coming up with a suitable name for a definition.
Relation to Alternative Notions of Interpretability. Piltaver et al. (2016) use a very similar definition
when they study how the response time for various data- and model-related tasks such as ”classify”, ”ex-
plain”, ”validate”, or ”discover” varies with changes in the structure of learned decision trees. Another
variant of this definition was suggested by Dhurandhar et al. (2017; 2018), who consider interpretabil-
ity relative to a target model, typically (but not necessarily) a human user. More precisely, they define a
2We are grateful to one of our reviewers for pointing out that this essentially is in line with the cognitive science perspective on
comprehension as proposed by Johnson-Laird (1981), where understanding a natural language sentence or text means to be able to
draw valid conclusions and inferences from it.
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learned model as δ -interpretable relative to a target model if the target model can be improved by a factor
of δ (e.g., w.r.t. predictive accuracy) with information obtained by the learned model. All these notions
have in common that they relate interpretability to a performance aspect, in the sense that a task can be
performed better or performed at all with the help of the learned model.
As illustrated in Figure 1, we consider understandability, readability and mental fit as alternative terms
for syntactic interpretability. Understandability is considered as a direct synonym for comprehensibility
(Bibal & Fre´nay, 2016). Readability clearly corresponds to syntactic level. The term mental fit may re-
quire additional explanation. We used it in the sense of van den Eijkel (1999) to denote suitability of the
representation (i.e. rules) for a given purpose (to explain a classification model).
2.3 Justifiability
A key aspect on interpretability is that a concept is consistent with available domain knowledge, which
we call epistemic interpretability. Martens & Baesens (2010) have introduced this concept under the name
of justifiability. They consider a model to be more justifiable if it better conforms to domain knowledge,
which may be viewed as constraints to which a justifiable model has to conform (hard constraints) or should
better conform (soft constraints). Martens et al. (2011) provide a taxonomy of such constraints, which
include univariate constraints such as monotonicity as well as multivariate constraints such as preferences
for groups of variables.
We paraphrase and slightly generalize this notion in the following definition:
Definition 2 (Justifiability) A model m1 is more ”justifiable” than a model m2 if m1 violates fewer con-
straints that are imposed by the user’s prior knowledge.
Martens et al. (2011) also define an objectivemeasure for justifiability, which essentially corresponds to
a weighted sum over the fractions of cases where each variable is needed in order to discriminate between
different class values.
Relation to Comprehensibility and Plausibility. Definition 1 (comprehensibility) addresses the syntac-
tical level of understanding, which is is a prerequisite for justifiability. What this definition does not cover
are facets of interpretability that relate to one’s background knowledge. For example, an empty model or a
default model, classifying all examples as positive, is very simple to interpret, comprehend and apply, but
such model will hardly be justifiable.
Clearly, one needs to be able to comprehend the definition of a concept before it can be checked whether
it corresponds to existing knowledge. Conversely, we view justifiability as a prerequisite to our notion of
plausibility, which we will define more precisely in the next section: a theory that does not conform to
domain knowledge is not plausible, but, on the other hand, the user may nevertheless assess different
degrees of plausibility to different explanations that are all consistent with our knowledge. In fact, many
scientific and in particular philosophical debates are about different, conflicting theories, which are all
justifiable but have different degrees of plausibility for different groups of people.
Relation to Alternative Notions of Interpretability. Referring to Figure 1, we view plausibility as an
aspect of epistemic interpretability, similar to notions like explainability, trusthworthiness and credibility.
Both trustworthiness and credibility imply evaluation of the model against domain knowledge. Explain-
ability is harder to define and has received multiple definitions in the literature. We essentially follow Gall
(2019), who makes a distinction that is similar to our notions of syntactic and epistemic interpretability:
in his view, interpretability is to allow the user to grasp the mechanics of a process (similar to the notion
of mental fit that we have used above), whereas explainability also implies a deeper understanding of why
the process works in this way. This requires the ability to relate the notion to existing knowledge, which is
why we view it primarily as an aspect of epistemic interpretability.
2.4 Plausibility
In this paper, we focus on a pragmatic aspect of interpretability, which we refer to as plausibility. We
primarily view this notion in the sense of ”user acceptance” or ”user preference”. However, as discussed
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QOL = High :- Many events take place.
QOL = High :- Host City of Olympic Summer Games.
QOL = Low :- African Capital.
(a) rated highly by users
QOL = High :- # Records Made >= 1, # Companies/Organisations >= 22.
QOL = High :- # Bands >= 18, # Airlines founded in 2000 > 1.
QOL = Low :- # Records Made = 0, Average January Temp <= 16.
(b) rated lowly by users
Figure 2: Good discriminative rules for the quality of living of a city (Paulheim, 2012b)
in Section 2.1, this also means that it has to rely on aspects of syntactic and epistemic interpretability as
prerequisites. For the purposes of this paper, we define plausibility as follows:
Definition 3 (Plausibility) A model m1 is more ”plausible” than a model m2 if m1 is more likely to be
accepted by a user thanm2.
Within this definition, the word “accepted” bears the meaning specified by the Cambridge English Dictio-
nary3 as “generally agreed to be satisfactory or right”.
Our definition of plausibility is less objective than the above definition of comprehensibility because
it always relates to the subject’s perception of the utility of a given explanation, i.e., its pragmatic aspect.
Plausibility, in our view, is inherently subjective, i.e., it relates to the question how useful a model is
perceived by a user. Thus, it needs to be evaluated in introspective user studies, where the users explicitly
indicate how plausible an explanation is, or which of two explanations appears to be more plausible. Two
explanations that can equally well be applied in practice (and thus have the same syntactic interpretability)
and are both consistent with existing knowledge (and thus have the same epistemic interpretability), may
nevertheless be perceived as having different degrees of plausibility.
Relation to Comprehensibility and Justifiability. A model may be consistent with domain knowledge,
but nevertheless appear implausible. Consider, e.g., the rules shown in Figure 2, which have been derived
by the Explain-a-LOD system (Paulheim & Fu¨rnkranz, 2012). The rules provide several possible expla-
nations for why a city has a high quality of living, using Linked Open Data as background knowledge.
Clearly, all rules are comprehensible and can be easily applied in practice. They also appear to be justi-
fiable, in the sense that all of them appear to be consistent with prior knowledge. For example, while the
number of records made in a city is certainly not a prima facie aspect of its quality of living, it is reasonable
to assume a correlation between these two variables. Nevertheless, the first three rules appear to be more
plausible to a human user, which was also confirmed in an experimental study (Paulheim, 2012a,b).
Relation to Alternative Notions of Interpretability. In Figure 1 we consider interestingness, usability,
and acceptability as related terms. All these notions imply some degree of user acceptance or fitness for
given purpose.
In the remainder of the paper, we will typically talk about ”plausibility” in the sense defined above,
but we will sometimes use terms like ”interpretability” as a somewhat more general term. We also use
”comprehensibility”, mostly when we refer to syntactic interpretability, as discussed and defined above.
However, all terms are meant to be interpreted in an intuitive, and non-formal way.4
3https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/accepted
4In particular, we do not intend to touch upon formal notions of plausibility, such as those given in the Dempster-Shafer theory,
where plausibility of an evidence is defined as an upper bound on the belief in the evidence, or more precisely, as the converse of
one’s belief in the opposite of the evidence (Dempster, 1967; Shafer, 1976).
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Table 1: Overview of the datasets used for generating rule pairs
# pairs dataset data source # instances # attr. target
80 Traffic LOD 146 210 rate of traffic accidents in a country
36 Quality LOD 230 679 quality of living in a city
32 Movies LOD 2000 1770 movie rating
10 Mushroom UCI 8124 23 mushroom poisonous/edible
3 Setup of Crowdsourcing Experiments on Plausibility
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on the plausibility of rules. In particular, we report on a series of
five crowdsourcing experiments, which relate the perceived plausibility of a rule to various factors such as
rule complexity, attribute importance or centrality. As a basis we used pairs of rules generated by machine
learning systems, typically one rule representing a shorter, and the other a longer explanation. Participants
were then asked to indicate which one of the pair they preferred.
The selection of crowdsourcing as a means of acquiring data allows us to gather thousands of responses
in a manageable time frame while at the same time ensuring our results can be easily replicated.5 In the
following, we describe the basic setup that is common to all performed experiments. Most of the setup is
shared for the subsequent experiments and will not be repeated, only specific deviations will be mentioned.
Cognitive science research has different norms for describing experiments than those that are commonly
employed in machine learning research.6 Also, the parameters of the experiments, such as the amount of
payment, is described in somewhat greater detail than usual in machine learning, because of the general
sensitivity of the participants to such conditions.
We tried to respect these differences by dividing experiment descriptions here and in subsequent sec-
tions into subsections entitled ”Material”, ”Participants”, ”Methodology”, and ”Results”, which corre-
spond to the standard outline of an experimental account in cognitive science. In the following, we describe
the general setup that applies to all experiments in the following sections, where then the main focus can
be put on the results.
3.1 Material
For each experiment, we generated rule pairs generated with two different learning algorithms, and asked
users about their preference. The details of the rule generation and selection process are described in this
section.
3.1.1 Domains
For the experiment, we used learned rules in four domains (Table 1):
Mushroom contains mushroom records drawn from Field Guide to North AmericanMushrooms (Lincoff,
1981). Being available at the UCI repository (Dua & Karra Taniskidou, 2017), it is arguably one
of the most frequently used datasets in rule learning research, its main advantage being discrete,
understandable attributes.
Traffic is a statistical dataset of death rates in traffic accidents by country, obtained from the WHO.7
5To this end, source datasets, preprocessing code, the responses obtained with crowdsourcing, and the code used to analyze them
were made available at https://github.com/kliegr/rule-length-project . The published data do not contain quiz failure
rates (qfr in Table 4–Table 8), since these were computed from statistics only displayed in the dashboard of the used crowdsourcing
platform upon completion of the crowdsourcing tasks.
6In fact, with psychometrics, an entire field is devoted to proper measurement of psychological phenomena (Furr & Bacharach,
2008).
7http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_traffic/en/
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Quality is a dataset derived from the Mercer Quality of Living index, which collects the perceived quality
of living in cities world wide.8
Movies is a dataset of movie ratings obtained from MetaCritic.9
The last three datasets were derived from the Linked Open Data (LOD) cloud (Ristoski et al., 2016). Orig-
inally, they consisted only of a name and a target variable, such as a city and its quality-of-living index, or a
movie and its rating. The names were then linked to entities in the public LOD dataset DBpedia, using the
method described by Paulheim & Fu¨rnkranz (2012). From that dataset, we extracted the classes to which
the entities belong, using the deep classification of YAGO, which defines a very fine grained class hierarchy
of several thousand classes. Each class was added as a binary attribute. For example, the entity for the city
of Vienna would get the binary features European Capitals, UNESCO World Heritage Sites, etc.
The goal behind these selections was that the domains are general enough so that the participants are
able to comprehend a given rule without the need for additional background knowledge, but are never-
theless not able to reliably judge the validity of a given rule. Thus, participants will need to rely on their
common sense in order to judge which of two rules appears to be more convincing. This also implies that
we specifically did not expect the users to have expert knowledge in these domains.
3.1.2 Rule Generation
We used two different approaches to generate rules for each of the four domains mentioned in the previous
section.
Class Association Rules: We used a standard implementation of the APRIORI algorithm for association
rule learning (Agrawal et al., 1993; Hahsler et al., 2011) and filtered the output for class association
rules with a minimum support of 0.01, minimum confidence of 0.5, and a maximum length of 5.
Pairs were formed between all rules that correctly classified at least one shared instance. Although
other more sophisticated approaches (such as a threshold on the Dice coefficient) were considered, it
turned out that the process outlined above produced rule pairs with quite similar values of confidence
(i.e. most equal to 1.0), except for theMovies dataset.
Classification Rules: We used a simple top-down greedy hill-climbing algorithm that takes a seed example
and generates a pair of rules, one with a regular heuristic (Laplace) and one with its inverted counter-
part. As shown by Stecher et al. (2016) and illustrated in Figure 5, this results in rule pairs that have
approximately the same degree of generality but different complexities.
From the resulting rule sets, we selected several rule pairs consisting of a long and a short rule that
have the same or a similar degree of generality.10 For Quality andMovies, all rule pairs were used. For the
Mushroom dataset, we selected rule pairs so that every difference in length (one to five) is represented. All
selected rule pairs were pooled, so we did not discriminate between the learning algorithm that was used
for generating them. For the Traffic dataset the rule learner generated a higher number of rules than for
the other datasets, which allowed us to select the rule pairs for annotation in such a way that various types
of differences between rules in each pair were represented. Since this stratification procedure, detailed in
(Kliegr, 2017), applied only to one of the datasets, we do not expect this design choice to have profound
impact on the overall results and omit a detailed description here.
As a final step, we automatically translated all rule pairs into human-friendly HTML-formatted text,
and randomized the order of the rules in the rule pair. Example rules for the four datasets are shown in
Figure 3. The first column of Table 1 shows the final number of rule pairs generated in each domain.
8http://across.co.nz/qualityofliving.htm
9http://www.metacritic.com/movie
10The generality of a rule is defined via the set of examples a rule covers. Two rules that cover the same set of examples have
the same generality, even if they have a different number of conditions. Examples include an itemset and its closure, or the elephant
example discussed further below in Section 4.2. We use the phrase ”degree of generality” somewhat loosely to refer to two rules that
cover an equal number of examples, such as the pair of first rules of the two solutions in the Mushroom dataset (Figure 5).
9
Figure 3: Example translated rules for the four datasets
3.2 Methodology
The generated rule pairs were then evaluated in a user study on a crowdsourcing platform, where partici-
pants were asked to issue a preference between the plausibility of the shown rules. This was then correlated
to various factors that could have an influence on plausibility.
3.2.1 Definition of Crowdsourcing Experiments
As the experimental platform we used the CrowdFlower crowdsourcing service.11 Similar to the better-
known Amazon Mechanical Turk, CrowdFlower allows to distribute questionnaires to participants around
the world, who complete them for remuneration. The remuneration is typically a small payment in US
dollars—for one judgment relating to one rule we paid 0.07 USD—but some participants may receive the
payment in other currencies, including in game currencies (“coins”).
A crowdsourcing task performed in CrowdFlower consists of a sequence of steps:
1. The CrowdFlower platform recruits participants, so-called workers for the task from a pool of its
users, who match the level and geographic requirements set by the experimenter. The workers decide
to participate in the task based on the payment offered and the description of the task.
2. Participants are presented assignments which contain an illustrative example.
3. If the task contains test questions, each worker has to pass a quiz mode with test questions. Partici-
pants learn about the correct answer after they pass the quiz mode, and have the option to contest the
correct answer if they consider it incorrect.
4. Participants proceed to the work mode, where they complete the task they have been assigned by the
experimenter. The task typically has the form of a questionnaire. If test questions were defined by
the experimenter, the CrowdFlower platform randomly inserts test questions into the questionnaire.
Failing a predefined proportion of hidden test questions results in removal of the worker from the
task. Failing the initial quiz or failing a task can also reduce participants’ accuracy on the Crowd-
Flower platform. Based on the average accuracy, participants can reach one of the three levels. A
higher level gives a user access to additional, possibly better paying tasks.
5. Participants can leave the experiment at any time. To obtain payment for their work, they need
to submit at least one page of work. After completing each page of work, the worker can opt to
start another page. The maximum number of pages per participant is set by the experimenter. As a
consequence, two workers can contribute a different number of judgments to the same task.
6. If a bonus was promised, the qualifying participants receive extra credit.
11Since our experiments, CrowdFlower has been re-branded under the name Figure Eight and is now available at
https://www.figure-eight.com/ .
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Figure 4: Example instructions for experiments 1–3. The example rule pair was adjusted based on the
dataset. For Experiment 3, the box with the example rule additionally contained values of confidence and
support, formatted as shown in Figure 8.
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Table 2: Variables used in Experiment 1–5. ∆ after a variable refers to the difference of its values of a
given rule pair. Plausibility was elicited on a five-level linguistic scale ranging from−2 for “Rule 2 (strong
preference)” to +2 for “Rule 1 (strong preference)”.
independent variable dependent variable
Exp. name data type name data type
1 rule length ∆ continuous plausibility discrete
2 rule length ∆ continuous plausibility discrete
3 rule support ∆, rule confidence ∆ discrete plausibility discrete
4 attribute importance avg ∆, att. imp. max
∆, literal imp. avg ∆, lit. imp. max ∆
continuous plausibility discrete
5 literal PageRank avg ∆, literal PageRank
max ∆
continuous plausibility discrete
The workers were briefed with task instructions, which described the purpose of the task, gave an ex-
ample rule, and explained plausibility as the elicited quantity (cf. Figure 4). As part of the explanation, the
participants were given definitions of “plausible” sourced from the Oxford Dictionary12 and the Cambridge
Dictionary13 (British and American English). The individual task descriptions differed for the five tasks,
and will be described in more detail later in the paper in the corresponding sections. Table 2 shows a brief
overview of the factors variables and their data types for the five experiments.
3.2.2 Evaluation
Rule plausibility was elicited on a five-level linguistic scale ranging from “Rule 2 (strong preference)” to
“Rule 1 (strong preference)”, which were interpreted as ordinal values from −2 to +2. Evaluations were
performed at the level of individual judgments, also called micro-level, i.e., each response was considered
to be a single data point, and multiple judgments for the same pair were not aggregated prior to the analysis.
By performing the analysis at the micro-level, we avoided the possible loss of information as well as the
aggregation bias (Clark & Avery, 1976). Also, as shown for example by Robinson (1950), the ecological
(macro-level) correlations are generally larger than the micro-level correlations, therefore by performing
the analysis on the individual level we obtain more conservative results.
We report rank correlation between a factor and the observed evaluation (Kendall’s τ , Spearman’s ρ)
and tested whether the coefficients are significantly different from zero. We will refer to the values of
Kendall’s τ as the primary measure of rank correlation, since according to Kendall & Gibbons (1990) and
Newson (2002), the confidence intervals for Spearman’s ρ are less reliable than confidence intervals for
Kendall’s τ .
For all obtained correlation coefficients we compute the p-value, which is the probability of obtaining
a correlation coefficient at least as extreme as the one that was actually observed assuming that the null
hypothesis holds, i.e., that there is no correlation between the two variables. The typical cutoff value for
rejecting the null hypothesis is α = 0.05.
3.3 Participants
The workers in the CrowdFlower platform were invited to participate in individual tasks. CrowdFlower
divides the available workforce into three levels depending on the accuracy they obtained on earlier tasks.
As the level of the CrowdFlower workers we chose Level 2, which was described as follows: “Contributors
in Level 2 have completed over a hundred Test Questions across a large set of Job types, and have an
extremely high overall Accuracy.”.
In order to avoid spurious answers, we also employed a minimum threshold of 180 seconds for com-
pleting a page; workers taking less than this amount of time to complete a page were removed from the
job. A maximum time required to complete the assignment was not specified, and the maximum number
of judgments per contributor was not limited.
12https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/plausible
13https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/plausible
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Table 3: Geographical distribution of collected judgments
(a) Experiments 1–3
Group 1 judgments Group 2 judgments Group 3 judgments total
USA UK Can USA UK Can USA UK Can judgments
Quality 68 64 52 96 40 44 364
Movies 80 52 28 76 30 58 84 44 32 484
Traffic 204 120 84 212 116 72 808
Mushroom 106 84 60 97 21 32 400
total 458 320 224 481 207 206 84 44 32 2056
(b) Experiments 4–5
Literal relevance Attribute relevance total
USA UK Can USA UK Can judgments
Quality 63 65 37 165
Movies 74 46 30 150
Traffic 164 58 68 0 10 25 325
Mushroom 70 56 44 23 31 38 262
total 371 225 179 23 41 63 902
For quality assurance, each participant who decided to accept the task first faced a quiz consisting of a
random selection of previously defined test questions. These had the same structure as regular questions but
additionally contained the expected correct answer (or answers) as well as an explanation for the answer.
We used swap test questions where the order of the conditions was randomly permuted in each of the two
pairs, so that the participant should not have a preference for either of the two versions. The correct answer
and explanation was only shown after the worker had responded to the question. Only workers achieving
at least 70% accuracy on test questions could proceed to the main task.
3.3.1 Statistical Information about Participants
CrowdFlower does not publish demographic data about its base of workers. Nevertheless, for all executed
tasks, the platform makes available the location of the worker submitting each judgment. In this section,
we use this data to elaborate on the number and geographical distribution of workers participating in Ex-
periments 1–5 described later in this paper.
Table 3a reports on workers participating in Experiments 1–3, where three types of guidelines were
used in conjunction with four different datasets, resulting in 9 tasks in total (not all combinations were
tried). Experiments 4–5 involved different guidelines (for determining attribute and literal relevance) and
the same datasets. The geographical distribution is reported in Table 3b. In total, the reported results are
based on 2958 trusted judgments.14 Actually, more judgments were collected, but some were excluded due
to automated quality checks.
In order to reduce possible effects of language proficiency, we restricted our participants to English-
speaking countries. Most judgments (1417) were made by workers from United States, followed by the
United Kingdom (837) and Canada (704). The number of distinct participants for each crowdsourcing
task is reported in detailed tables describing the results of the corresponding experiments (part column in
Tables 4–8). Note that some workers participated in multiple tasks. The total number of distinct participants
across all tasks reported in Tables 3a and 3b is 390.
14A trusted judgment is an answer from a worker that passed the initial quiz and on submitting the work had accuracy score higher
than preset minimum accuracy on any hidden test questions. Only trusted judgments were used for analyses.
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3.3.2 Representativeness of Crowdsourcing Experiments
There is a number of differences between crowdsourcing and the controlled laboratory environment pre-
viously used to run psychological experiments. The central question is to what extent do the cognitive
abilities and motivation of participants differ between the crowdsourcing cohort and the controlled labo-
ratory environment. Since there is a small amount of research specifically focusing on the population of
the CrowdFlower platform, which we use in our research, we present data related to Amazon Mechanical
Turk, under the assumption that the descriptions of the populations will not differ substantially.15 This is
also supported by previous work such as (Wang et al., 2015), which has indicated that the user distribution
of CrowdFlower and AMT is comparable.
The population of crowdsourcing workers is a subset of the population of Internet users, which is de-
scribed in a recent meta study by Paolacci & Chandler (2014) as follows: “Workers tend to be younger
(about 30 years old), overeducated, underemployed, less religious, and more liberal than the general pop-
ulation.” While there is limited research on workers’ cognitive abilities, Paolacci et al. (2010) found “no
difference between workers, undergraduates, and other Internet users on a self-report measure of numeracy
that correlates highly with actual quantitative abilities.” According to a more recent study by Crump et al.
(2013), workers learn more slowly than university students and may have difficulties with complex tasks.
Possibly the most important observation related to the focus of our study is that according to Paolacci et al.
(2010) crowdsourcing workers “exhibit the classic heuristics and biases and pay attention to directions at
least as much as subjects from traditional sources.”
4 Interpretability, Plausibility, and Model Complexity
The rules shown in Figure 2 may suggest that simpler rules are more acceptable than longer rules because
the highly rated rules (a) are shorter than the lowly rated rules (b). In fact, there are many good reasons
why simpler models should be preferred over more complex models. Obviously, a shorter model can be
interpreted with less effort than a more complex model of the same kind, in much the same way as reading
one paragraph is quicker than reading one page. Nevertheless, a page of elaborate explanations may be
more comprehensible than a single dense paragraph that provides the same information (as we all know
from reading research papers).
Other reasons for preferring simpler models include that they are easier to falsify, that there are fewer
simpler theories than complex theories, so the a priori chances that a simple theory fits the data are lower,
or that simpler rules tend to be more general, cover more examples and their quality estimates are therefore
statistically more reliable.
However, one can also find results that throw doubt on this claim. In particular in cases where not
only syntactic interpretability is considered, there are some previous works where it was observed that
longer rules are preferred by human experts. In the following, we discuss this issue in some depth, by
first reviewing the use of a simplicity bias in machine learning (Section 4.1), then taking the alternative
point of view and recapitulating works where more complex theories are preferred (Section 4.2), and then
summarizing the conflicting past evidence for either of the two views (Section 4.3). Finally, in Section 4.4,
we report on the results of our first experiment, which aimed at testing whether rule length has an influence
on the interpretability or plausibility of found rules at all, and, if so, whether people tend to prefer longer
or shorter rules.
4.1 The Bias for Simplicity
Michalski (1983) already states that inductive learning algorithms need to incorporate a preference criterion
for selecting hypotheses to address the problem of the possibly unlimited number of hypotheses, and that
this criterion is typically simplicity, referring to philosophical works on simplicity of scientific theories
by Kemeny (1953) and Post (1960), which refine the initial postulate attributed to Ockham, which we
15This is supported by the fact that until about 2014, CrowdFlower platform involved Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) workers. As of 2017, these workers are no longer involved, because according to CrowdFlower, the
AMT channel was both slower and less accurate than other channels used by the CrowdFlower platform (cf.
http://turkrequesters.blogspot.com/2014/01/crowdflower-dropping-mechanical-turk.html).
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discuss further below. According to Post (1960), judgments of simplicity should not be made “solely on
the linguistic form of the theory”.16 This type of simplicity is referred to as linguistic simplicity. A related
notion of semantic simplicity is described through the falsifiability criterion (Popper, 1935, 1959), which
essentially states that simpler theories can be more easily falsified. Third, Post (1960) introduces pragmatic
simplicity which relates to the degree to which the hypothesis can be fitted into a wider context.
Machine learning algorithms typically focus on linguistic or syntactic simplicity, by referring to the
description length of the learned hypotheses. The complexity of a rule-based model is typically measured
with simple statistics, such as the number of learned rules and their length, or the total number of condi-
tions in the learned model (cf., e.g., Todorovski et al., 2000; Lakkaraju et al., 2016; Minnaert et al., 2015;
Wang et al., 2017). Inductive rule learning is typically concerned with learning a set of rules or a rule list
which discriminates positive from negative examples (Fu¨rnkranz et al., 2012; Fu¨rnkranz & Kliegr, 2015).
For this task, a bias towards simplicity is necessary because for a contradiction-free training set, it is trivial
to find a rule set that perfectly explains the training data, simply by converting each example to a maximally
specific rule that covers only this example.
Occam’s Razor, “Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate”,17 which is attributed to English
philosopher and theologian William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), has been put forward as support for a
principle of parsimony in the philosophy of science (Hahn, 1930). In machine learning, this principle is
generally interpreted as “given two explanations of the data, all other things being equal, the simpler ex-
planation is preferable” (Blumer et al., 1987), or simply “choose the shortest explanation for the observed
data” (Mitchell, 1997). While it is well-known that striving for simplicity often yields better predictive
results—mostly because pruning or regularization techniques help to avoid overfitting—the exact formu-
lation of the principle is still subject to debate (Domingos, 1999), and several cases have been observed
where more complex theories perform better (Murphy & Pazzani, 1994; Webb, 1996; Bensusan, 1998).
Much of this debate focuses on the aspect of predictive accuracy. When it comes to understandability,
the idea that simpler rules are more comprehensible is typically unchallenged. A nice counter example is
due to Munroe (2013), who observed that route directions like “take every left that doesn’t put you on a
prime-numbered highway or street named for a president” could be most compressive but considerably
less comprehensive. Although Domingos (1999) argues in his critical review that it is theoretically and
empirically false to favor the simpler of two models with the same training-set error on the grounds that
this would lead to lower generalization error, he concludes that Occam’s Razor is nevertheless relevant for
machine learning but should be interpreted as a preference for more comprehensible (rather than simple)
models. Here, the term ”comprehensible” clearly does not refer to syntactical length.
A particular implementation of Occam’s razor in machine learning is the minimum description length
(MDL; Rissanen, 1978) or minimum message length (MML18; Wallace & Boulton, 1968) principle which
is an information-theoretic formulation of the principle that smaller models should be preferred (Gru¨nwald,
2007). The description length that should be minimized is the sum of the complexity of the model plus
the complexity of the data encoded given the model. In this way, both the complexity and the accuracy
of a model can be traded off: the description length of an empty model consists only of the data part,
and it can be compared to the description length of a perfect model, which does not need additional in-
formation to encode the data. The theoretical foundation of this principle is based on the Kolmogorov
complexity (Li & Vita´nyi, 1993), the essentially uncomputable length of the smallest model of the data. In
practice, different coding schemes have been developed for encoding models and data and have, e.g., been
used as selection or pruning criteria in decision tree induction (Needham & Dowe, 2001; Mehta et al.,
1995), inductive rule learning (Quinlan, 1990; Cohen, 1995; Pfahringer, 1995) or for pattern evaluation
(Vreeken et al., 2011). The ability to compress information has also been proposed as a basis for human
comprehension and thus forms the backbone of many standard intelligence tests, which aim at detecting
patterns in data. Psychometric artificial intelligence (Bringsjord, 2011) extends this definition to AI in gen-
eral. For an extensive treatment of the role of compression in measuring human and machine intelligence
we refer the reader to Herna´ndez-Orallo (2017).
16Kemeny (1953) gave the example that among competing explanations for the solar system, the model of Tycho Brahe is linguis-
tically simpler than Copernicus’ theory because of the convenient choice of the co-ordinate system associated with the heliocentric
view.
17Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity.
18The differences between the two views are irrelevant for our argumentation.
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Many works make the assumption that the interpretability of a rule-based model can be measured by
measures that relate to the complexity of the model, such as the number of rules or the number conditions.
A maybe prototypical example is the Interpretable Classification Rule Mining (ICRM) algorithm, which
”is designed to maximize the comprehensibility of the classifier by minimizing the number of rules and the
number of conditions” via an evolutionary process (Cano et al., 2013). Similarly, Minnaert et al. (2015)
investigate a rule learner that is able to optimize multiple criteria, and evaluate it by investigating the
Pareto front between accuracy and comprehensibility, where the latter is measured with the number of rules.
Lakkaraju et al. (2016) propose a method for learning rule sets that simultaneously optimizes accuracy and
interpretability, where the latter is again measured by several conventional data-driven criteria such as rule
overlap, coverage of the rule set, and the number of conditions and rules in the set. Most of these works
clearly focus on syntactic interpretability.
4.2 The Bias for Complexity
Even though most systems have a bias toward simpler theories for the sake of overfitting avoidance and
increased accuracy, some rule learning algorithms strive for more complex rules, and have good reasons
for doing so. Already Michalski (1983) has noted that there are two different kinds of rules, discriminative
and characteristic. Discriminative rules can quickly discriminate an object of one category from objects of
other categories. A simple example is the rule
elephant :- trunk.
which states that an animal with a trunk is an elephant. This implication provides a simple but effective
rule for recognizing elephants among all animals. However, it does not provide a very clear picture on
properties of the elements of the target class. For example, from the above rule, we do not understand that
elephants are also very large and heavy animals with a thick gray skin, tusks and big ears.
Characteristic rules, on the other hand, try to capture all properties that are common to the objects of
the target class. A rule for characterizing elephants could be
heavy, large, gray, bigEars, tusks, trunk :- elephant.
Note that here the implication sign is reversed: we list all properties that are implied by the target class,
i.e., by an animal being an elephant. Even though discriminative rules are easier to comprehend in the
syntactic sense, we argue that characteristic rules are often more interpretable than discriminative rules
from a pragmatic point of view. For example, in a customer profiling application, we might prefer to not
only list a few characteristics that discriminate one customer group from the other, but are interested in all
characteristics of each customer group.
The distinction between characteristic and discriminative rule is also reminiscent of the distinction
between defining and characteristic features of categories. Smith et al. (1974)19 argue that both of them
are used for similarity-based assessments of categories to objects, but that only the defining features are
eventually used when similarity-based categorization over all features does not give a conclusive positive
or negative answer.
Characteristic rules are very much related to formal concept analysis (Wille, 1982; Ganter & Wille,
1999). Informally, a concept is defined by its intent (the description of the concept, i.e., the conditions of
its defining rule) and its extent (the instances that are covered by these conditions). A formal concept is then
a concept where the extension and the intension are Pareto-maximal, i.e., a concept where no conditions
can be added without reducing the number of covered examples. In Michalski’s terminology, a formal
concept is both discriminative and characteristic, i.e., a rule where the head is equivalent to the body.
It is well-known that formal concepts correspond to closed itemsets in association rule mining, i.e., to
maximally specific itemsets (Stumme et al., 2002). Closed itemsets have been mined primarily because
they are a unique and compact representative of equivalence classes of itemsets, which all cover the same
instances (Zaki & Hsiao, 2002). However, while all itemsets in such an equivalence class are equivalent
with respect to their support, they may not be equivalent with respect to their understandability or interest-
ingness.
19Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer who pointed us towards this and some of the following works.
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[2160|0] p :- odor = foul.
[1152|0] p :- gill-color = buff.
[ 256|0] p :- odor = pungent.
[ 192|0] p :- odor = cresote.
[ 72|0] p :- spore-print-color = green.
[ 36|0] p :- stalk-color-below-ring = cinnamon.
[ 24|0] p :- stalk-color-below-ring = scaly.
[ 4|0] p :- cap-surface = grooves.
[ 1|0] p :- cap-shape = conical.
[ 16|0] p :- stalk-color-below-ring = brown, stalk-surface-above-ring = silky.
[ 3|0] p :- habitat = leaves, stalk-color-below-ring = white.
(a) using the Laplace heuristic hLap for refinement
[2192|0] p :- veil-color = white, gill-spacing = close, bruises? = no,
ring-number = one, stalk-surface-above-ring = silky.
[ 864|0] p :- veil-color = white, gill-spacing = close, gill-size = narrow,
population = several, stalk-shape = tapering.
[ 336|0] p :- stalk-color-below-ring = white, ring-type = pendant,
stalk-color-above-ring = white, ring-number = one,
cap-surface = smooth, stalk-root = bulbous, gill-spacing = close.
[ 264|0] p :- stalk-surface-below-ring = smooth, stalk-surface-above-ring = smooth,
ring-type = pendant, stalk-shape = enlarging, veil-color = white,
gill-size = narrow, bruises? = no.
[ 144|0] p :- stalk-shape = enlarging, stalk-root = bulbous,
stalk-color-below-ring = white, ring-number = one.
[ 72|0] p :- stalk-shape = enlarging, gill-spacing = close, veil-color = white,
gill-size = broad, spore-print-color = green.
[ 44|0] p :- stalk-surface-below-ring = scaly, stalk-root = club.
(b) using the inverted Laplace heuristic 4Lap for refinement
Figure 5: Two decision lists learned for the class poisonous in theMushroom dataset.
Gamberger & Lavracˇ (2003) introduce supporting factors as a means for complementing the explana-
tion delivered by conventional learned rules. Essentially, they are additional attributes that are not part of
the learned rule, but nevertheless have very different distributions with respect to the classes of the appli-
cation domain. In a way, enriching a rule with such supporting factors is quite similar to computing the
closure of a rule. In line with the results of Kononenko (1993), medical experts found that these supporting
factors increase the plausibility of the found rules.
Stecher et al. (2014) introduced so-called inverted heuristics for inductive rule learning. The key idea
behind them is a rather technical observation based on a visualization of the behavior of rule learning
heuristics in coverage space (Fu¨rnkranz & Flach, 2005), namely that the evaluation of rule refinements is
based on a bottom-up point of view, whereas the refinement process proceeds top-down, in a general-to-
specific fashion. As a remedy, it was proposed to “invert” the point of view, resulting in heuristics that
pay more attention to maintaining high coverage on the positive examples, whereas conventional heuristics
focus more on quickly excluding negative examples. Somewhat unexpectedly, it turned out that this results
in longer rules, which resemble characteristic rules instead of the conventionally learned discriminative
rules. For example, Figure 5 shows the two decision lists that have been found for the Mushroom dataset
with the conventional Laplace heuristic hLap (top) and its inverted counterpart 4Lap (bottom). Although
fewer rules are learned with 4Lap, and thus the individual rules are more general on average, they are also
considerably longer. Intuitively, these rules also look more convincing, because the first set of rules often
only uses a single criterion (e.g., odor) to discriminate between edible and poisonous mushrooms. Thus,
even though the shorter rules may be more comprehensible in the syntactic sense, the longer rules appear
to be more plausible. Stecher et al. (2016) and Valmarska et al. (2017) investigated the suitability of such
rules for subgroup discovery, with somewhat inconclusive results.
4.3 Conflicting Evidence
The above-mentioned examples should help to motivate that the complexity of models may have an effect
on the interpretability of a model. Even in cases where a simpler and a more complex rule covers the same
number of examples, shorter rules are not necessarily more interpretable, at least not when other aspects
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of interpretability beyond syntactic comprehensibility are considered. There are a few isolated empirical
studies that add to this picture. However, the results on the relation between the size of representation
and interpretability are limited and conflicting, partly because different aspects of interpretability are not
clearly discriminated.
Larger Models are Less Interpretable. Huysmans et al. (2011) were among the first that actually tried
to empirically validate the often implicitly made claim that smaller models are more interpretable. In
particular, they related increased complexity to measurable events such as a decrease in answer accuracy,
an increase in answer time, and a decrease in confidence. From this, they concluded that smaller models
tend to be more interpretable, proposing that there is a certain complexity threshold that limits the practical
utility of a model. However, they also noted that in parts of their study, the correlation of model complexity
with utility was less pronounced. The study also does not report whether the participants of their study had
any domain knowledge relating to the used data, so that it cannot be ruled out that the obtained result was
caused by lack of domain knowledge.20 A similar study was later conducted by Piltaver et al. (2016), who
found a clear relationship between model complexity and interpretability in decision trees.
In most previous works, interpretability was interpreted in the sense of syntactic comprehensibility, i.e.,
the pragmatic or epistemic aspects of interpretability were not addressed.
Larger Models are More Interpretable. A direct evaluation of the perceived interpretability of classi-
fication models has been performed by Allahyari & Lavesson (2011). They elicited preferences on pairs
of models which were generated from two UCI datasets: Labor and Contact Lenses. What is unique to
this study is that the analysis took into account the participants’ estimated knowledge about the domain of
each of the datasets. On Labor, they were expected to have good domain knowledge but not so for Contact
Lenses. The study was performedwith 100 students and involved several decision tree induction algorithms
(J48, RIDOR, ID3) as well as rule learners (PRISM, REP, JRIP). It was found that larger models were
considered as more comprehensible than smaller models on the Labor dataset whereas the users showed
the opposite preference for Contact Lenses. Allahyari & Lavesson (2011) explain the discrepancy with
the lack of prior knowledge for Contact Lenses, which makes it harder to understand complex models,
whereas in the case of Labor, “. . . the larger or more complex classifiers did not diminish the understand-
ing of the decision process, but may have even increased it through providing more steps and including
more attributes for each decision step.” In an earlier study, Kononenko (1993) found that medical experts
rejected rules learned by a decision tree algorithm because they found them to be too short. Instead, they
preferred explanations that were derived from a Naı¨ve Bayes classifier, which essentially showed weights
for all attributes, structured into confirming and rejecting attributes.
To some extent, the results may appear to be inconclusive because the different studies do not clearly
discriminate between different aspects of interpretability. Most of the results that report that simpler mod-
els are more interpretable refer to syntactic interpretability, whereas, e.g., Allahyari & Lavesson (2011)
tackle epistemic interpretability by taking the users’ prior knowledge into account. Similarly, the study of
Kononenko (1993) has aspects of epistemic interpretability, in that ”too short” explanations contradict the
experts’ experience. pragmatic interpretability of the models has not been explicitly addressed, nor are we
aware of any studies that explicitly relate plausibility to model complexity.
4.4 Experiment 1: Are Shorter Rules More Plausible?
Motivated by the somewhat inconclusive evidence in previous works on interpretability and complexity,
we set up a crowdsourcing experiment that specifically focuses on the aspect of plausibility. In this and
the experiments reported in subsequent sections, the basic experimental setup follows the one discussed in
Section 3. Here, we only note task-specific aspects.
20The lack of domain knowledge was hypothesized to account for differences observed in another study by (Allahyari & Lavesson,
2011), which we discuss in more detail below.
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Figure 6: Example rule pair used in experiments 1–3. For Experiment 3, the description of the rule also
contained values of confidence and support, formatted as shown in Figure 8.
Material. The questionnaires presented pairs of rules as described in section 3.1.2, and asked the partic-
ipants to give a) judgment which rule in each pair is more preferred and b) optionally a textual explanation
for the judgment. A sample question is shown in Figure 6. The judgments were elicited using a drop down
box, where the participants could choose from the following five options: “Rule 1 (strong preference)”,
“Rule 1 (weak preference)”, “No preference”, “Rule 2 (weak preference)”, “Rule 2 (strong preference)”.
As shown in Figure 6, the definition of plausibility was accessible to participants at all times, since it was
featured below the drop-down box. As optional input, the workers could provide a textual explanation of
their reasoning behind the assigned preference, which we informally evaluated but which is not further
considered in the analyses reported in this paper.
Participants. The number of judgments per rule pair for this experiment was 5 for the Traffic, Quality,
and Movies datasets. The Mushroom dataset had only 10 rule pairs, therefore we opted to collect 25
judgments for each rule pair in this dataset.
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Results. Table 4 summarizes the results of this crowdsourcing experiment. In total, we collected 1002
responses, which is on average 6.3 judgments for each of the 158 rule pairs. On two of the datasets, Quality
andMushroom, there was a strong, statistically significant positive correlation between rule length and the
observed plausibility of the rule, i.e., longer rules were preferred. In the other two datasets, Traffic and
Movies, no significant difference could be observed in either way.
In any case, these results show that there is no negative correlation between rule length and plausibility.
In fact, in two of the four datasets, we even observed a positive correlation, meaning that in these cases
longer rules were preferred.
Table 4: Rule-length experiment statistics. pairs refers to the distinct number of rule pairs, judg to the
number of trusted judgments, the quiz failure rate qfr to the percentage of participants that did not pass the
initial quiz as reported by the CrowdFlower dashboard, part to the number of trusted distinct workers, τ
and ρ to the observed correlation values with p-values in parentheses.
pairs judg qfr part Kendall’s τ Spearman’s ρ
Traffic 80 408 11 93 0.05 (0.226) 0.06 (0.230)
Quality 36 184 11 41 0.20 (0.002) 0.23 (0.002)
Movies 32 160 5 40 -0.01 (0.837) -0.02 (0.828)
Mushrooms 10 250 13 84 0.37 (0.000) 0.45 (0.000)
total 158 1002 11 258
5 The Conjunction Fallacy
Human-perceived plausibility of a hypothesis has been extensively studied in cognitive science. The best-
known cognitive phenomenon related to our focus area of the influence of the number of conditions in a
rule on its plausibility is the conjunctive fallacy. This fallacy falls into the research program on cognitive
biases and heuristics carried out by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman since the 1970s. The outcome of
this research program can be succinctly summarized by a quotation from Kahneman’s Nobel Prize lecture
at Stockholm University on December 8, 2002:
“. . ., it is safe to assume that similarity is more accessible than probability, that changes are
more accessible than absolute values, that averages are more accessible than sums, and that
the accessibility of a rule of logic or statistics can be temporarily increased by a reminder.”
(Kahneman, 2003)
In this section, we will briefly review some aspects of this program, highlighting those that seem to be
important for inductive rule learning. For a more thorough review we refer to Kahneman et al. (1982) and
Gilovich et al. (2002), a more recent, very accessible introduction can be found in Kahneman (2011).
5.1 The Linda Problem
The conjunctive fallacy is in the literature often defined via the “Linda” problem. In this problem, par-
ticipants are asked whether they consider it more plausible that a person Linda is more likely to be (a) a
bank teller or (b) a feminist bank teller (Figure 7). Tversky & Kahneman (1983) report that based on the
provided characteristics of Linda, 85% of the participants indicate (b) as the more probable option. This
was essentially confirmed in by various independent studies, even though the actual proportions may vary.
In particular, similar results could be observed across multiple settings (hypothetical scenarios, real-life
domains), as well as for various kinds of participants (university students, children, experts, as well as
statistically sophisticated individuals) (Tentori & Crupi, 2012).
However, it is easy to see that the preference for (b) is in conflict with elementary laws of probabilities.
Essentially, in this example, participants are asked to compare conditional probabilities Pr(F ∧B | L) and
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Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.
She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
Which is more probable?
(a) Linda is a bank teller.
(b) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the
feminist movement.
Figure 7: The Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983).
Pr(B | L), where B refers to “bank teller”, F to “active in feminist movement” and L to the description
of Linda. Of course, the probability of a conjunction, Pr(A∧ B), cannot exceed the probability of its
constituents, Pr(A) and Pr(B) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). In other words, as it always holds for the
Linda problem that Pr(F ∧B | L) ≤ Pr(B | L), the preference for alternative F ∧B (option (b) in Figure 7)
is a logical fallacy.
5.2 The Representativeness Heuristic
According to Tversky & Kahneman (1983), the results of the conjunctive fallacy experiments manifest
that “a conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents”. It is a symptom of a more
general phenomenon, namely that people tend to overestimate the probabilities of representative events
and underestimate those of less representative ones. The reason is attributed to the application of the
representativeness heuristic. This heuristic provides humans with means for assessing a probability of an
uncertain event. According to the representativeness heuristic, the probability that an object A belongs to
a class B is evaluated “by the degree to which A is representative of B, that is by the degree to which A
resembles B” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
This heuristic relates to the tendency to make judgments based on similarity, based on a rule “like
goes with like”. According to Gilovich & Savitsky (2002), the representativeness heuristic can be held
accountable for a number of widely held false and pseudo-scientific beliefs, including those in astrology or
graphology.21 It can also inhibit valid beliefs that do not meet the requirements of resemblance.
A related phenomenon is that people often tend to misinterpret the meaning of the logical connective
“and”. Hertwig et al. (2008) hypothesized that the conjunctive fallacy could be caused by “a misunder-
standing about conjunction”, i.e., by a different interpretation of “probability” and “and” by the participants
than assumed by the experimenters. They discussed that “and” in natural language can express several rela-
tionships, including temporal order, causal relationship, and most importantly, can also indicate a collection
of sets instead of their intersection. For example, the sentence “He invited friends and colleagues to the
party” does not mean that all people at the party were both colleagues and friends. According to Sides et al.
(2002), “and” ceases to be ambiguous when it is used to connect propositions rather than categories. The
authors give the following example of a sentence which is not prone to misunderstanding: “IBM stock will
rise tomorrow and Disney stock will fall tomorrow”. Similar wording of rule learning results may be, de-
spite its verbosity, preferred. We further conjecture that representations that visually express the semantics
of “and” such as decision trees may be preferred over rules, which do not provide such visual guidance.
21Gilovich & Savitsky (2002) gives the following example: resemblance of the physical appearance of the sign, such as crab, is
related in astrology with personal traits, such as appearing tough on the outside. For graphology, the following example is given:
handwriting to the left is used to indicate that the person is holding something back.
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Table 5: Effect of intersection test questions that are meant to ensure that participants understand the
logical semantics of ”and”. pairs refers to the distinct number of rule pairs, judg to the number of trusted
judgments, the quiz failure rate qfr to the percentage of workers that did not pass the initial quiz as reported
by the CrowdFlower dashboard, part to the number of trusted distinct workers, and τ to the observed
correlation values with p-values in parentheses.
Group 1: w/o int. test questions Group 2: with int. test questions
dataset pairs judg qfr part Kendall’s τ judg qfr part Kendall’s τ
Quality 36 184 11 41 0.20 (0.002) 180 31 45 -0.03 (0.624)
Mushroom 10 250 13 84 0.37 (0.000) 150 44 54 0.28 (0.000)
5.3 Experiment 2: Misunderstanding of “and” in Inductively Learned Rules
Given its omnipresence in rule learning results, it is vital to assess to what degree the “and” connective is
misunderstood when rule learning results are interpreted. In order to gauge the effect of the conjunctive
fallacy, we carried out a separate set of crowdsourcing tasks, To control for misunderstanding of “and”, the
group of workers approached in Experiment 2 additionally received intersection test questions which were
intended to ensure that all participants understand the and conjunction the same way it is defined in the
probability calculus. In order to correctly answer these, the respondent had to realize that the antecedent
of one of the rules contains mutually exclusive conditions. The correct answer was a weak or strong
preference for rule which did not contain the mutually exclusive conditions.
Material. The participants were presented with the same rule pairs as in Experiment 1 (Group 1). The
difference between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 was only one manipulation: instructions in Experi-
ment 2 additionally contained the intersection test questions, not present in Experiment 1. We refer to the
participants that received these test questions as Group 2.
Participants. Same as for Experiment 1 described earlier. There was one small change for the Mush-
room dataset, where for economical constraints we collected 15 judgments for each rule pair within Ex-
periment 2, instead of 25 collected in Experiment 1.
Results. We state the following proposition: The effect of higher perceived interpretability of longer
rules disappears when it is ensured that participants understand the semantics of the “and” conjunction.
The corresponding null hypothesis is that the correlation between rule length and plausibility is no longer
statistically significantly different from zero for participants that successfully completed the intersection
test questions (Group 2). We focus on the analysis on Mushroom and Quality datasets on which we had
initially observed a higher plausibility of longer rules.
The results presented in Table 5 show that the correlation coefficient is still statistically significantly
different from zero for theMushroom dataset with Kendall’s τ at 0.28 (p< 0.0001), but not for the Quality
dataset, which has τ not different from zero at p < 0.05 (albeit at a much higher variance). This suggests
that at least on the Mushroom dataset, there are other factors apart from “misunderstanding of and” that
cause longer rules to be perceived as more plausible. We will take a look at some possible causes in the
following sections.
6 Insensitivity to Sample Size
In the previous sections, we have motivated that rule length is by itself not an indicator for the plausi-
bility of a rule if other factors such as the support and the confidence of the rule are equal. In this and
following sections, we will discuss the influence of these and a few alternative factors, partly motivated by
results from the psychological literature. The goal is to motivate some directions for future research on the
interpretability and plausibility of learned concepts.
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Rule 1: if the movie falls into all of the following group(s) (simultaneously) English-language Films
then the movie is rated as bad
Additional Information: if the movie falls into all of the following group(s) (simultaneously) En-
glishlanguage Films then the movie is rated as bad
In our data, there are 995 movies which match the conditions of this rule. Out of these 518 are
predicted correctly as having bad rating. The confidence of the rule is 52%.
In other words, out of the 995 movies that match all the conditions of the rule, the number of movies
that are rated as bad as predicted by the rule is 518. The rule thus predicts correctly the rating in
518/995=52 percent of cases.
Rule 2: if the movie falls into all of the following group(s) (simultaneously) Films Released In 2010
and English-language Films then the movie is rated as bad
Additional Information: In our data, there are 55 movies which match the conditions of this rule.
Out of these 29 are predicted correctly as having bad rating. The confidence of the rule is 53%.
In other words, out of the 55 movies that match all the conditions of the rule, the number of movies
that are rated as bad as predicted by the rule is 29. The rule thus predicts correctly the rating in
29/55=53 percent of cases.
Figure 8: Rule pair including the additional information on support and confidence.
6.1 Support and Confidence
In the terminology used within the scope of cognitive science (Griffin & Tversky, 1992), confidence cor-
responds to the strength of the evidence and support to the weight of the evidence. Results in cognitive
science for the strength and weight of evidence suggest that the weight is systematically undervalued while
the strength is overvalued. According to Camerer & Weber (1992), this was, e.g., already mentioned by
Keynes (1922) who drew attention to the problem of balancing the likelihood of the judgment and the
weight of the evidence in the assessed likelihood. In particular, Tversky & Kahneman (1971) have argued
that human analysts are unable to appreciate the reduction of variance and the corresponding increase in
reliability of the confidence estimate with increasing values of support. This bias is known as insensitivity
to sample size, and essentially describes the human tendency to neglect the following two principles: a)
more variance is likely to occur in smaller samples, b) larger samples provide less variance and better evi-
dence. Thus, people underestimate the increased benefit of higher robustness of estimates made on a larger
sample.
In the previous experiments, we controlled the rules selected into the pairs so they mostly had identical
or nearly identical confidence and support. Furthermore, the confidence and support values of the shown
rules were not revealed to the participants during the experiments. However, in real situations, rules in
the output of inductive rule learning have varying quality, which is communicated mainly by the values of
confidence and support. Given that longer rules can fit the data better, they tend to be higher on confidence
and lower on support. This implies that if confronted with two rules of different length, where the longer
has a higher confidence and the shorter a higher support, the analyst may prefer the longer rule with higher
confidence (all other factors equal). These deliberations lead us to the following proposition: When both
confidence and support are explicitly revealed, confidence but not support will positively increase rule
plausibility.
6.2 Experiment 3: Is rule confidence perceived as more important than support?
We aim to evaluate the effect of explicitly revealed confidence (strength) and support (weight) on rule
preference. In order to gauge the effect of rule quality measures confidence and support, we performed an
additional experiment.
Material. The participants were presented with rule pairs like in the previous two experiments. We used
only rule pairs from theMovies dataset, where the differences in confidence and support between the rules
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Table 6: Kendall’s τ on the Movies dataset with (Group 1) and without (Group 2) additional information
about the number of covered good and bad examples. pairs refers to the distinct number of rule pairs, judg
to the number of trusted judgments, the quiz failure rate qfr to the percentage of workers that did not pass
the initial quiz as reported by the CrowdFlower dashboard, part to the number of trusted distinct workers,
and ρ to the observed correlation values with p-values in parentheses.
Group 1 Group 3
Without information With information
measure pairs judg qfr part Kendall’s τ judg qfr part Kendall’s τ
Support
32 160 5 40
−0.07 (0.402)
160 5 40
−0.08 (0.361)
Confidence 0.00 (0.938) 0.24 (0.000)
in the pairs were largest. The only difference in the setup between Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 was that
participants now also received information about the number of correctly and incorrectly covered instances
for each rule, along with the support and confidence values. Figure 8 shows an example of this additional
information provided to the participants. Workers that received this extra information are referred to as
Group 3.
Participants. This setup was the same as for the preceding two experiments.
Results. Table 6 shows the correlations of the rule quality measures confidence and support with plau-
sibility. It can be seen that there is a relation to confidence but not to support, even though both were
explicitly present in descriptions of rules for Group 3. Thus, our result supports the hypothesis that insen-
sitivity to sample size effect is applicable to the interpretation of inductively learned rules. In other words,
when both confidence and support are stated, confidence positively affects the preference for a rule whereas
support tends to have no impact.
The results also show that the relationship between revealed rule confidence and plausibility is causal.
This follows from confidence not being correlated with plausibility in the original experiment (Group 1
in Figure 6), which differed only via the absence of the explicitly revealed information about rule quality.
While such conclusion is intuitive, to our knowledge it has not yet been empirically confirmed before.
7 Relevance of Conditions in Rule
An obvious factor that can determine the perceived plausibility of a proposed rule is how relevant it appears
to be. Of course, rules that contain more relevant conditions will be considered to be more acceptable. One
way of measuring this could be in the strength of the connection between the condition (or a conjunction
of conditions) with the conclusion. However, in our crowdsourcing experiments we only showed sets of
conditions that are equally relevant in the sense that their conjunction covers about the same number of
examples in the shown rules or that the rules have a similar strength of connection. Nevertheless, the
perceived or subjective relevance of a condition may be different for different users.
There are several cognitive biases that can distort the correlation between the relevance of conditions
and the the judgment of plausibility. One of the most recently discovered is the weak evidence effect,
according to which evidence in favor of an outcome can actually decrease the probability that a person
assigns to it. In an experiment in the area of forensic science reported by Martire et al. (2013), it was
shown that participants presented with evidence weakly supporting guilt tended to “invert” the evidence,
thereby counterintuitively reducing their belief in the guilt of the accused.
7.1 Attribute and Literal Relevance
In order to analyze the effect of relevance in the rule learning domain, we decided to enrich our input
data with two supporting crowdsourcing tasks, which aimed at collecting judgments of attribute and literal
relevance.
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We kindly ask you to assist us in an
experiment that will help researchers
understand which properties influence
mushroom being considered as
poisonous/edible.
Example task follows:
Property: Cap shape
Possible values: bell, conical, convex,
flat, knobbed, sunken
What is the relevance of the property
given above for determining whether a
mushroom is edible or poisonous?
Give a judgment on a 10 point scale:
1 = Completely irrelevant
10 = Very relevant
Figure 9: Attribute relevance question for Mush-
room.
We kindly ask you to assist us in an
experiment that will help researchers
understand which factors can influence
movie ratings.
Example task follows:
Condition: Academy Award Winner or Nominee
The condition listed above will
contribute to a movie being rated as:
Good (Strong influence)
Good (Weak influence)
No influence
Bad (Weak influence)
Bad (Strong influence)
Select one option.
Figure 10: Literal relevance test question for
Movies.
Attribute Relevance. Attribute relevance corresponds to human perception of the ability of a specific
attribute to predict values of the attribute in rule consequent. For example, in the Movies data, the release
date of a film may be perceived as less relevant for determining the quality of a film than its language.
Attribute relevance also reflects a level of recognition of the explanatory attribute (cf. also Section 8),
which is a prerequisite to determining the level of association with the target attribute. As an example of a
specific attribute that may not be recognized consider “SoundMix” for a movie rating problem. This would
contrast with attributes such as “Oscar winner” or “year of release”, which are equally well recognized, but
clearly associated to a different degree with the target.
Literal Relevance. Literal relevance goes one step further than attribute relevance by measuring human
perception of the ability of a specific condition to predict a specific value of the attribute in the rule conse-
quent. It should be noted that we consider the literal relevance to also embed attribute relevance to some
extent. For example, the literal (“film released in 2001”) conveys also the attribute (“year of release”).
However, in addition to the attribute name, literal also conveys a specific value, which may not be recog-
nized by itself. This again raises the problem of recognition as a prerequisite to association.
7.2 Experiment 4: Influence of Attribute and Literal Relevance
The experiments were performed similarly as the previous ones using crowdsourcing. Since the relevance
experiments did not elicit preferences for rule pairs, there are multiple differences from the setup described
earlier. We summarize the experiments in the following, but refer the reader to Kliegr (2017) for additional
details.
Material. The data collectedwithin Experiments 1–3were enrichedwith variables denoting the relevance
of attributes and literals of the individual rules. Given that in Experiments 1–3 plausibility was elicited for
rule pairs, the variables representing relevance were computed as differences of values obtained for the
rules in the pair.
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Table 7: Attribute and Literal Relevance (Group 1, Kendall’s τ). Column att refers to number of distinct
attributes, lit to number of distinct literals (attribute-value pairs), judg to the number of trusted judgments,
excl to the percentage of workers that were not trusted on the basis of giving justifications shorter than 11
characters, and part to the number of trusted distinct workers.
Attribute relevance
Dataset att judg excl part Avg Max
Traffic 14 35 70 6 0.01 (0.757) 0.00 (0.983)
Mushroom 10 92 66 31 −0.11 (0.018) 0.27 (0.000)
Literal relevance
Dataset lit judg excl part Avg Max
Quality 33 165 40 45 0.29 (0.000) 0.31 (0.000)
Movies 30 150 19 40 0.15 (0.012) 0.22 (0.000)
Traffic 58 290 40 75 0.04 (0.311) 0.01 (0.797)
Mushroom 34 170 16 42 −0.19 (0.000) 0.11 (0.037)
Each rule pair was enrichedwith four22 variables according to the following pattern: “[Literal|Attribute]
Rel[Avg|Max]∆”. To compute the enrichment variable, the value of the relevance metric for the second
rule in the pair (r2) was subtracted from the value for the first rule (r1). For example,
LiteralRelAvg∆ = LiteralRelAvg(r1)−LiteralRelAvg(r2), (1)
where LiteralRelAvg(r1), LiteralRelAvg(r2) represent the average relevance of literals (conditions) present
in the antecedent of rule r1 (r2) in the pair.
The attribute relevance experiments were prepared for theMushroom and Traffic datasets. An example
wording of the attribute relevance elicitation task for the Mushroom dataset is shown in Figure 9. An
example wording of the literal relevance elicitation task for the Movies dataset is shown in Figure 10. In
this case, there was a small difference in setup between the experiments on LOD datasets and theMushroom
dataset. The latter task did contain links to Wikipedia for individual literals as these were directly available
from the underlying dataset. For the Mushroom dataset no such links were available and thus these were
not included in the task.
Results. Table 7 shows the correlations between plausibility and the added variables representing at-
tribute and literal relevance on the data collected for Group 1 from the previous experiments. The results
confirm that literal relevance has a strong correlation with the judgment of the plausibility of a rule. A rule
which contained (subjectively) more relevant literals than the second rule in the pair was more likely to be
evaluated favorably than rules that do not contain such conditions. This pattern was found valid with vary-
ing levels of statistical significance across all evaluation setups in Table 7, except for the average relevance
in the smallestMushroom dataset.
Note that the effect is strongest for the maximum relevance, which means that it is not necessary that
all the literals are deemed important, but it suffices if a few (or even a single) condition is considered to be
relevant. Traffic was the only dataset where such effects could not be observed, but this may have to do
with the fact that the used attributes (mostly geographic regions) strongly correlate with traffic accidents
but do not show a causal relationship. The examination of the relation between the objective relevance of
conditions in a rule and their impact on the subjective perception of the rule is an interesting yet challenging
area of further study. The perception can be influenced by multiple cognitive phenomena, such as the weak
evidence effect.
22We initially also experimented with computing several other enrichment variables not reported here (derived from label length
and depth in the taxonomy, using ratios instead of differences, and using minimum in addition to average and maximum). For these
variables, we either did not obtain statistically significant results, or the interpretation was not intuitive, therefore we do not report
these additional evaluations here.
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Table 8: Correlation of PageRank in the knowledge graph with plausibility (Group 1, Kendall’s τ). Column
lit refers to number of distinct literals (attribute-value pairs), judg to the number of trusted judgments, qfr
to the percentage of non-trusted workers, and part to the number of trusted distinct workers.
Dataset lit judg qfr part Avg Max
Quality 33 165 40 45 0.01 (0.882) 0.07 (0.213)
Movies 30 150 19 40 (0.051) −0.07 (0.275)
Traffic 58 290 40 75 0.03 (0.533) 0.05 (0.195)
8 Recognition Heuristic
The recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002) is the best-known of the fast and frugal
heuristics that have been popularized in several books, such as Gigerenzer et al. (1999, 2011); Gigerenzer
(2015). It essentially states that when you compare two objects according to some criterion that you cannot
directly evaluate, and ”one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized
object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.” Note that this is independent of the criterion
that should be maximized, it only depends on whether there is an assumed positive correlation with the
recognition value of the object. For example, if asked whether Hong Kong or Chongqing is the larger city,
people tend to pick Hong Kong because it is better known (at least in the western hemisphere), even though
Chongqing has about four times as many inhabitants. Thus, it may be viewed as being closely associated
to relevance, where, in the absence of knowledge about a fact, the city’s relevance is estimated by how well
it is recognized.
The recognition heuristic can manifest itself as a preference for rules containing a recognized literal
or attribute in the antecedent of the rule. Since the odds that a literal will be recognized increase with the
length of the rule, it seems plausible that the recognition heuristic generally increases the preference for
longer rules. One could argue that for longer rules, the odds of occurrence of an unrecognized literal will
also increase. The counterargument is the empirical finding that—under time pressure—analysts assign
recognized objects a higher value than to unrecognized objects. This happens also in situations when
recognition is a poor cue (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006).
8.1 Experiment 5: Modeling Recognition Heuristic using PageRank
In an attempt to measure representativeness, we resort to measuring the centrality of a concept using its
PageRank (Page et al., 1999) in a knowledge graph. In three of our datasets, the literals correspond to
Wikipedia articles, which allowed us to use PageRank computed from the Wikipedia connection graph for
these literals. Similarly as for the previous experiment, each rule pair was enriched with two additional
variables corresponding to the difference in the average and maximum PageRank associated with literals in
the rules in the pair. We refer the reader to Kliegr (2017) for additional details regarding the experimental
setup.
Table 8 shows the correlations between plausibility and the difference in PageRank as a proxy for the
recognition heuristic. While, we have not obtained statistically strong correlation in the datasets, for two of
the datasets (Quality and Traffic) the direction of the correlation is according to the expectation: plausibility
rises with increased recognition. More research to establish the degree of actual recognition and PageRank
values is thus needed. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, this is the first experiment that attempted to use
PageRank to model recognition.
9 Semantic Coherence
Thagard (1989) has noted the importance of coherence for explanatory power. This concept is closely
related to epistemic interpretability. Note, however, that it is not only important that the explanation is
coherent with existing background knowledge but the explanatory factors should also be coherent with
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Unemployment = low :- area > 6720,
population > 607430.
Unemployment = high :- latitude <= 44.1281,
longitude <= 6.3333, longitude > 1.8397.
(a) good discriminative rules, highly coherent
Unemployment = high :- latitude <= 44.189,
population <= 635272
Unemployment = high :- longitude > 1.550,
population > 282277
(b) good discriminative rules, lowly coherent
Figure 11: Example rules for unemployment in different French regions
each other, as well as with the concept that should be explained. Thagard (1989) writes that ”a hypothesis
coheres with propositions that it explains, or that explain it, or that participate with it in explaining other
propositions, or that offer analogous explanations.”
In previous work (Paulheim, 2012a), we conducted experiments with various statistical datasets en-
riched with Linked Open Data, one being the already mentioned Quality of Living dataset, another one
denoting the corruption perceptions index (CPI)23 in different countries worldwide. For each of those, we
created rules and had them rated in a user study.
From that experiment, we experienced that many people tend to trust rules more if there is a high
semantic coherence between the conditions in the rule. For example, a rule stating the the quality of living
in a city is high if it is a European capital of culture and is the headquarter of many book publishers would
be accepted since both conditions refer to cultural topics, whereas a rule involving European capital of
culture and many airlines founded in that city would be considered to be less plausible.
Figure 11 depicts a set of results obtained on an unemployment statistic for French departments, en-
riched with data from DBpedia (Ristoski & Paulheim, 2013). There are highly coherent rules combining
attributes such as latitude and longitude, or population and area, as well as lowly coherent rules, combining
geographic and demographic indicators. Interestingly, all those combinations perform a similar split of the
dataset, i.e., into the continental and overseas departments of France.
At first glance, semantic coherence and discriminative power of a rule look like a contradiction, since
semantically related attributes may also correlate: as in the example above, attributes describing the cultural
life in a city can be assumed to correlate more strongly than, say, cultural and economic indicators. Hence,
it is likely that a rule learner, without any further modifications, will produce semantically incoherent rules
at a higher likelihood than semantically coherent ones.
However, in Gabriel et al. (2014), we have shown that it is possible to modify rule learners in a way so
that they produce more coherent rules. To that end, attribute labels are linked to a semantic resource such
as WordNet (Fellbaum, 1998), and for each pair of attributes, we measure the distance in that semantic
network. In the first place, this provides us with a measure for semantic coherence within a rule. Next,
we can explicitly use that heuristic in the rule learner, and combine it with traditional heuristics that are
used for adding conditions to a rule. Thereby, a rule learner can be modified to produce rules that are
semantically coherent.
The most interesting finding of the above work was that semantically coherent rules can be learned
without significantly sacrificing accuracy of the overall rule-based model. This is possible in cases with lots
of attributes that a rule learner can exploit for achieving a similar split of the dataset. In the above example
with the French departments, any combination of latitude, longitude, population and area can be used to
discriminate continental and overseas departments; therefore, the rule learner can pick a combination that
has both a high discriminative power and a high coherence.
23https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
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parity :- x1, x2, x3, x4, not x5.
parity :- x1, x2, not x3, not x4, not x5.
parity :- x1, not x2, x3, not x4, not x5.
parity :- x1, not x2, not x3, x4, not x5.
parity :- not x1, x2, not x3, x4, not x5.
parity :- not x1, x2, x3, not x4, not x5.
parity :- not x1, not x2, x3, x4, not x5.
parity :- not x1, not x2, not x2, not x4, not x5.
parity :- x1, x2, x3, not x4, x5.
parity :- x1, x2, not x3, x4, x5.
parity :- x1, not x2, x3, x4, x5.
parity :- not x1, x2, x3, x4, x5.
parity :- not x1, not x2, not x3, x4, x5.
parity :- not x1, not x2, x3, not x4, x5.
parity :- not x1, x2, not x3, not x4, x5.
parity :- x1, not x2, not x2, not x4, x5.
(a) flat unstructured rule set
parity45 :- x4, x5.
parity45 :- not x4, not x5.
parity345 :- x3, not parity45.
parity345 :- not x3, parity45.
parity2345 :- x2, not parity345.
parity2345 :- not x2, parity345.
parity :- x1, not parity2345.
parity :- not x1, parity2345.
(b) deep structured rule base with three invented predicates
Figure 12: Unstructured and structured rule sets for the parity concept.
10 Structure
Another factor which, in our opinion, contributes strongly to the interpretability of a rule-based model is its
internal logical structure. Rule learning algorithms typically provide flat lists that directly relate the input
to the output. Consider, e.g., the extreme case of learning a parity concept, which checks whether an odd or
an even number of r relevant attributes (out of a possibly higher total number of attributes) are set to true.
Figure 12(a) shows a flat rule-based representation of the target concept for r = 5, which requires 2r−1 =
16 rules, whereas a structured representation, which introduces three auxiliary predicates (parity2345,
parity345, and parity45) is much more concise using only 2 ·(r−1) = 8 rules (Figure 12(b)). We argue
that the parsimonious structure of the latter is much easier to comprehend because it uses only a linear
number of rules, and slowly builds up the complex target concept parity from the smaller subconcepts
parity2345, parity345, and parity45. This is in line with the criticism of Hu¨llermeier (2015) who
argued that the flat structure of fuzzy rules is one of the main limitations of current fuzzy rule learning
systems.
However, we are not aware of psychological work that supports this hypothesis. The results of a small
empirical validation were recently reported by Schmid et al. (2017), who performed a user study in which
the participants were shown differently structured elementary theories from logic programming, such as
definitions for grandfather,greatgrandfather, or ancestor, and it was observed how quickly queries
about a certain ancestry tree could be answered using these predicates. Among others, the authors posed
and partially confirmed the hypothesis that logical programs are more comprehensible if they are struc-
tured in a way that leads to a compression in length. In our opinion, further work is needed in order to see
whether compression is indeed the determining factor here. It also seems natural to assume that an impor-
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tant prerequisite for structured theories to be more comprehensible is that the intermediate concepts are by
themselvesmeaningful to the user. Interestingly, this was not confirmed in the experiments by Schmid et al.
(2017), where the so-called ”public” setting, in which all predicates had meaningful names, did not lead
to consistently lower answer times than the ”private” setting, in which the predicates did not have mean-
ingful names. They also could not confirm the hypothesis that it furthered comprehensibility when their
participants were explicitly encouraged to think about meaningful names for intermediate concepts.
Although there are machine learning systems that can tackle simple problems like the family do-
main, there is no system that is powerful enough to learn deeply structured logic theories for realistic
problems, on which we could rely for experimentally testing this hypothesis. In machine learning, this
line of work has been known as constructive induction (Matheus, 1989) or predicate invention (Stahl,
1996), but surprisingly, it has not received much attention since the classical works in inductive logic pro-
gramming in the 1980s and 1990s. One approach is to use a wrapper to scan for regularly co-occurring
patterns in rules, and use them to define new intermediate concepts which allow to compress the orig-
inal theory (Wnek & Michalski, 1994; Pfahringer, 1994, 1995). Alternatively, one can directly invoke
so-called predicate invention operators during the learning process, as, e.g., in Duce (Muggleton, 1987),
which operates in propositional logic, and its successor systems in first-order logic (Muggleton & Buntine,
1988; Kijsirikul et al., 1992; Kok & Domingos, 2007). One of the few recent works in this area is by
Muggleton et al. (2015), who introduced a technique that employs user-provided meta rules for proposing
new predicates.
None of these works performed a systematic evaluation of the generated structured theories from the
point of view of interpretability. Systems like MOBAL (Morik et al., 1993), which not only tried to learn
theories from data, but also provided functionalities for reformulating and restructuring the knowledge base
(Sommer, 1996), have not receivedmuch attention in recent years. We believe that providing functionalities
and support for learning structured knowledge bases is crucial for the acceptance of learned models in
complex domains. In a way, the recent success of deep neural networks needs to be carried over to the
learning of deep logical structures. Recent work on so-called sum-product nets, which combine deep
learning with graphical models and generate new concepts in their latent variables (Peharz et al., 2017),
may be viewed as a step into this direction.
11 Conclusion
The main goal of this paper was to motivate that interpretability of rules is an important topic that has
received far too little serious attention in the literature. Its main contribution lies in highlighting that plau-
sibility is an important aspect of interpretability, which, to our knowledge, has not been investigated before.
In particular, we observed that even rules that have the same predictive quality in terms of conventional
measures such as support and confidence, and will thus be considered as equally good explanations by
conventional rule learning algorithms, may be perceived with different degrees of plausibility.
More concretely, we reported on five experiments conducted in order to gain first insight into plausibil-
ity of rule learning results. Users were confronted with pairs of learned rules with approximately the same
discriminative power (as measured by conventional heuristics such as support and confidence), and were
asked to indicate which one seemed more plausible. The experiments were performed in four domains,
which were selected so that participants can be expected to be able to comprehend the given explanations
(rules), but not to reliably judge their validity without obtaining additional information. In this way, users
were guided to give an intuitive assessment of the plausibility of the provided explanation.
Experiment 1 explored the hypothesis whether the Occam’s razor principle holds for the plausibility of
rules, by investigating whether people consider shorter rules to be more plausible than longer rules. The
results obtained for four different domains indicated that this might not be the case, in fact we observed
statistically significant preference for longer rules on two datasets. In Experiment 2, we found support
for the hypothesis that the elevated preference for longer rules is partly due to the misunderstanding of
“and” that connects conditions in the presented rules: people erroneously find rules with more conditions
as more general. In Experiment 3, we focused on another ingredient of rules: the values of confidence
and support metrics. The results suggest that when both confidence and support are stated, confidence
positively affects plausibility and support is largely ignored. This confirms a prediction following from
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previous psychological research studying the insensitivity to sample size effect. As a precursor to a follow-
up study focusing on the weak evidence effect, Experiment 4 evaluated the relation between perceived
plausibility and strength of conditions in the rule antecedent. The results indicate that rule plausibility
is affected already if a single condition is considered to be relevant. Recognition is a powerful principle
underlying many human reasoning patterns and biases. In Experiment 5, we attempted to use PageRank
computed from Wikipedia graph as a proxy for how well a given condition is recognized. The results,
albeit statistically insignificant, suggest the expected pattern of positive correlation between recognition
and plausibility. This experiment is predominantly interesting from the methodological perspective, as it
offers a possible approach to approximation of recognition of rule conditions.
We acknowledge several limitations of the presented experiments. In particular, some of the results
might be influenced by the specific domains of the datasets involved. For some of the experiments (Ex-
periment 4) the collected number of judgments was also rather small affecting their statistical significance.
Another limitation is the absence of expert users as we relied solely on judgments elicited with crowd-
sourcing. Lastly, we lacked counsel of a psychologist skilled in designing and evaluating user experiments.
Overall, we suggest our experimental results should be replicated on other domains addressing also the
other limitations noted above.
In our view, a research program that aims at a thorough investigation of interpretability in machine
learning needs to resort to results in the psychological literature, in particular to cognitive biases and falla-
cies. We summarized some of these hypotheses, such as the conjunctive fallacy, and started to investigate
to what extent these can serve as explanations for human preferences between different learned hypotheses.
There are numerous other cognitive effects that can demonstrate how people assess rule plausibility, some
of which are briefly listed in Appendix 11 and discussed more extensively in Kliegr et al. (2018). Clearly,
more work along these lines is needed.
Moreover, it needs to be considered how cognitive biases can be incorporated into machine learning
algorithms. Unlike loss functions, which can be evaluated on data, it seems necessary that interpretability is
evaluated in user studies. Thus, we need to establish appropriate evaluation procedures for interpretability,
and develop appropriate heuristic surrogate functions that can be quickly evaluated and be optimized in
learning algorithms.
Finally, in our work we have largely ignored the issue of background knowledge by picking domains in
which we assumed that our participants have a basic knowledge that allows them to judge the plausibility
of rules. However, justifiability, i.e., whether a model is in line with existing background knowledge, is an
important prerequisite for plausibility. The work of Martens & Baesens (2010) is pioneering in that they
try to formalize this notion in the context of domain knowledge. Based on this, another promising research
direction is infusing semantic metadata into the learning process and exploiting it for enforcing the output
of rules that are likely to be accepted more by the end user.
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Appendix – A Brief Overview of Relevant Cognitive Heuristics and
Fallacies
In this appendix we provide a list of cognitive phenomena that can be important for interpretation of rule
learning results. However, we neither claim completeness, nor can we provide more than a very short
summary of each phenomenon. A more extensive treatment can be found in (Kliegr et al., 2018). An
extensive treatment of the subject can be found in (Kliegr et al., 2018).
The list is divided in three categories. The first two cover cognitive biases (also called illusions) that are
included in a recent authoritative review by Pohl (2017). The first category, Thinking, covers those related
to thinking processes. These require the person to apply a certain rule (such as the Bayes theorem). Since
many people do not know this rule, they have to apply it intuitively, which can result in errors. The second
category, Judgment, covers biases used by people when they are asked to rate some property of a given
object (such as a plausibility of a rule). Note that Pohl (2017) also defined a third category,Memory, which
we do not consider as directly relevant to our problem. Instead, we introduce “Other” category into which
we put cognitive phenomena that were not explicitly systematized by Pohl (2017), although many of the
phenomena listed under it clearly belong to one of the established categories.
Thinking.
• Base rate neglect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Bar-Hillel, 1980). Insensitivity to the prior proba-
bility of the outcome, violating the principles of probabilistic reasoning, especially Bayes’ theorem.
• Confirmation bias and positive test strategy (Nickerson, 1998). Seeking or interpretation of evidence
so that it conforms to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.
• Conjunction fallacy and representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Conjunction
fallacy occurs when a person assumes that a specific condition is more probable than a single general
condition in case the specific condition seems as more representative of the problem at hand.
Judgment.
• Availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The easier it is to recall a piece of information,
the greater the importance of the information.
• Effect of difficulty (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). If it is difficult to tell which one of two mutually ex-
clusive alternative hypotheses is better because both are nearly equally probable, people will grossly
overestimate the confidence associated with their choice. This effect is also sometimes referred to as
overconfidence effect (Pohl, 2017).
• Mere-exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968). Repeated encounter of a hypothesis results in increased pref-
erence.
Other.
• Ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961). People tend to favour options for which the probability of a
favourable outcome is known over options where the probability of favourable outcome is unknown.
Some evidence suggests that ambiguity aversion has a genetic basis (Chew et al., 2012).
• Averaging heuristic (Fantino et al., 1997). Joint probability of two events is estimated as an aver-
age of probabilities of the component events. This fallacy corresponds to believing that P(A,B) =
P(A)+P(B)
2
instead of P(A,B) = P(A)∗P(B).
• Confusion of the inverse (Plous, 1993). Conditional probability is equivocated with its inverse. This
fallacy corresponds to believing that P(A|B) = P(B|A).
• Context and trade-off contrast (Tversky & Simonson, 1993). The tendency to prefer alternative x
over alternative y is influenced by the context – other available alternatives.
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• Disjunction fallacy (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1993). People tend to think that it is more likely for an
object to belong to a more characteristic subgroup than to its supergroup.
• Information bias (Baron et al., 1988). People tend to belief that more information the better, even if
the extra information is irrelevant for their decision.
• Insensitivity to sample size (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Neglect of the following two principles:
a) more variance is likely to occur in smaller samples, b) larger samples provide less variance and
better evidence.
• Recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). If one of two objects is recognized and the
other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion.
• Negativity bias (Kanouse & Hanson Jr, 1987). People weigh negative aspects of an object more
heavily than positive ones.
• Primacy effect (Thorndike, 1927). This effect can be characterized by words of Edward Thorndike
(1874-1949), one of the founders of modern education psychology, as follows: “other things being
equal the association first formed will prevail” (Thorndike, 1927).
• Reiteration effect (Hasher et al., 1977). Frequency of occurrence is a criterion used to establish
validity of a statement.
• Unit bias (Geier et al., 2006). People tend to give equal weight to each condition at the expense of
detailed scrutiny of its actual weight.
• Weak evidence effect (Fernbach et al., 2011). Presenting weak, but supportive evidencemakes people
less confident in predicting a particular outcome than presenting no evidence at all.
While this list is certainly not exhaustive, it is long enough to illustrate that interpretability is a very complex
research challenge that cannot be met in passing but needs serious attention in our research programs.
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